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Abstract. When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust au-
thority will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with
an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition
is present ex-post. The main objective of this paper is to show that the an-
titrust authority must take into account the possibility for firms to collude
if a merger is rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion
ex-post (after a rejection of a merger) whereas they would not make col-
lusion ex-ante. All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a
minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. This article
does not only suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be
enforced but it also analyses the choice which firms have as to whether to
collude. We consider an industry with cost-asymmetric firms and we study
the analysis of collusion under leniency programmes.
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1 Introduction
Collusion enables firms to exert market power they would not otherwise
have, restricts competition and increases prices. Combatting collusion is a
major area of activity for any antitrust authority. In particular, this point
is addressed in merger cases. Ex ante, competition authorities can prevent
the emergence of an industry structure that is prone to collusion, by taking
into account this concern when examining proposed mergers. They can also
ban facilitating practices. Ex post, competition authorities can take steps
to fight collusion per se, e.g., by uncovering evidence of explicit coordination
or by attacking specific agreements that again facilitate collusion.
Economic theory suggests that a merger might engender the creation of
collusive outcomes because the merger reduces the number of firms and also
gives rise to a more symmetric distribution of assets.
Compte et al. (2002), inspired by the Nestle´-Perrier merger case1, showed
that the introduction of asymmetric capacities makes collusion more diffi-
cult to sustain when aggregate capacity is limited. Giving larger shares of
the collusive profits to the bigger firms alleviates somewhat the tension gen-
erated by asymmetric capacities, but it does not eliminate it entirely, and
the scope for collusion is nonetheless reduced.
Rothschild (1999) and Vasconcelos (2005) both dealt with collusion un-
der cost asymmetry when firms compete a` la Cournot. Rothschild used
standard grim trigger strategies. Vasconcelos looked for more general pun-
ishments with a stick-and-carrot structure as proposed by Abreu (1986,
1988) and analysed tacit collusion in quantity-supergames involving cost-
asymmetric firms and showed that if a merger brings about an increase in
the inequality of asset holdings then collusion will be inhibited.
All proposed mergers notified to the antitrust authority are examined to
see if they would significantly impede effective competition. The antitrust
1European Commission, Case Number IV/M 190: Nestle and Perrier, 92/553/EEC
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authority analyses if the proposed merger can make more likely or more
effective for firms to coordinate their actions (coordinated effects) and if it
can make profitable for the merging firms to reduce output and raise price
unilaterally (unilateral effects) 2.
When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust authority
will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with an
attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition
is present ex-post. But the latter is a strong assumption since it considers
that firms automatically act competitively after a rejection of a project of
merger. The antitrust authority does not take into account the possible
collusion after a rejection of a merger.
The main objective of this paper is to show that the antitrust authority
must take into account the possibility for firms to collude if a merger is
rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion ex-post (after
a rejection of a merger) whereas they would not make collusion ex-ante
(before a project of merger).
We analyse how asymmetry in cost function across firms, as was sug-
gested by Perry-Porter (1985), can affect the scope of collusion after a
merger. Perry and Porter (1985) but also Farrell and Shapiro (1990) chal-
lenged the view that a merged firm is no larger than any of the constituent
firms (as in the model of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds in 1983). These stud-
ies introduce the existence of some crucial assets that are in limited supply
in order to capture the notion that some firms are larger than others in a ho-
mogeneous product industry. This assumption implies rising marginal cost
of output production and, consequently, internal cost savings from mergers
could make a merger profitable.
In this setting we show that a merger, under certain conditions, can
create a market structure which decreases the possibility of collusion. In
2Council Regulation (EC) no 139/2004
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particular, when two firms with high production capacities merge, then the
space of parameters for which firms collude decreases after this merger.
All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal dis-
count factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. There is one main
difference between these papers and ours : this article does not only suggest
necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but we do
analyse the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We look at
the equilibrium path of firms. The analysis indicates whether collusion is
taking place or not in reality.
Another strand of literature related to this paper deals with leniency pro-
grammes (as Motta-Polo, 2003)(henceforth LP). These programmes reduce
fines for cartel members who report themselves to and assist the antitrust
authority, and the impact of LP can be seen in the recent increase in suc-
cessful cartel investigations. For example, in the period from 14 February
2002 to the end of 2005, the European Commission received 167 applications
under the 2002 Leniency Notice. Of these applications, 87 were requests for
immunity and 80 were requests for reduction in fines. The Commission has
granted 51 decisions for conditional immunity. Over the same period, the
Commission rejected or decided not to deal any further with 23 applications
and had under scrutiny 13 more recent applications.3
The presence of LP introduces a coordination game between the cartel
members (apply for leniency or not?). As in Motta-Polo (2003), LP have
two possible effects. The first is the deviation from the cartel agreement by
firms which report to the antitrust authority. The second (being a negative
effect) is the attenuation of the expected cost of anticompetitive behaviour
because of reduced fines. The key mechanism of LP is the rule that allows
firms to receive fine reductions even after an investigation is opened.
Motta-Polo (2003) showed that if the antitrust authority has limited
3European Commission, MEMO/06/357.
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resources, then the scope of collusion can be decreased by using LP. The main
difference between the paper of Motta and Polo and ours is that here there
is a possibility for some firms to merge. Moreover, we consider asymmetric
firms.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the basic
model. Characterizations of equilibria and implications for merger control
are provided in section 3. Concluding remarks follow in section 4. Proofs of
results and graphics appear in the appendix.
2 The model
Consider an industry with n asymmetric firms. By asymmetry it is meant
that firms have a different share of a specific asset that affects marginal costs.
More precisely, in the model, two identical firms have the same production
capacity, denoted by k1 = k2. The other firms have the same fraction of the
industry capital stock kj (∀j ∈ n, j 6= 1, 2). This asymmetry is introduced
in each firm´ s cost function. A firm is deemed large for the purposes of the
model if it owns a large fraction of the capital stock.
Following Perry and Porter (1985), cost is assumed depend on the capital
owned by the firms : C(qi, ki) =
q2i
2ki
+ qic, ∀i ∈ [1, n] where qi denotes the
quantity chosen by firm i, ∀i ∈ [1, n]. Fixed costs are zero.
Cost asymmetry is conventionnally seen as hindering collusion because
low-cost firms are more difficult to discipline, both because they might gain
more from undercutting their rivals and because they have less to fear from
possible retaliation from high-cost firms.
Firms compete on a Cournot basis with a homogeneous product. We
assume that the demand function is linear i.e., p = 1−Q.
Firms can make collusive agreements after firms 1 and 2 have proposed
a merger which has either been accepted or rejected by the competition
authority in the first period. The outcome of the execution of a collusive
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agreement is assumed to be that the colluding firms will thence reduce out-
put below the competitive level. Quantity competition also affects retalia-
tion possibilities as well as the short-run gains of deviations from collusive
conduct. Indeed, under quantity competition, one is less tempted to in-
crease production levels in order to deviate from a tacitly collusive level,
since prices will adjust to enable the competitors to sell all their output.
This would tend to make collusion easier to sustain. However, retaliation
is somewhat harder under quantity competition because the firm that is the
object of retaliation can always soften the blow (compared to a situation of
price competition) by changing its output level accordingly.
We extend the framework of Motta-Polo (2003) by introducing a first
stage in which the antitrust authority decides to accept or reject a notifi-
cation of merger between two firms. The antitrust authority (henceforth :
AA) uses leniency programmes; these programmes provide the incentive of
reduced fines to firms which reveal information about collusion to the AA.
Four exogenous parameters summarize the enforcement policy:
• F ∈ [0, F¯ ] : the value of the fine if firms are detected by the AA and
have not cooperated with it, F¯ being the maximum possible fine which
can be imposed.
• f ∈ [0, F ] : the value of the reduced fine for the firm which denounces
the collusive agreement. It is assumed that all firms which cooperate
with the AA will be granted reduced fines. It is also assumed that the
reduction is high enough in order for the LP be really effective because
if f is close to the full fine, F there is no incentive to reveal.
• α ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that firm is reviewed by the AA.
• s ∈ [0, 1] : the probability that the AA successfully concludes the
investigation when firms do not cooperate.
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Type I errors (firms not colluding are still prosecuted) are assumed not
to happen and Type II errors (colluding firms not fined) are assumed to
happen.
The collusion strategy is modelled on the basis of a trigger strategy:
once a firm deviates from the collusive agreement, all the firms will play non
cooperatively until the end of the game. These strategies have been initially
suggested by Friedman (1971).
The timing of the game is as follows:
The game starts (t = 0) with the AA approving or rejecting the notifi-
cation of the merger between two firms, 1 and 2.
After this first stage, the game is repeated indefinitely. It can be formally
described as follows.
At t = 1, firms decide to reach a collusive agreement or to deviate
(playing non cooperatively). If no firm deviates until a time t then they
collude again and get a profit piM . We study the case in which firms can
sustain the joint profit maximisation, so the subscriptM indicates a collusive
outcome since collusion aims at monopolizing the industry. If at time t the
AA decides to open an investigation then there are two assumed outcomes :
• Cooperation: firms denounce the cartel to the AA; they pay the re-
duced fine f and play non cooperatively during one period and restart
collusion after an inquiry is concluded. If however a firm deviates from
the collusive agreement, firms play non cooperatively until the end of
the game.
• No cooperation: the investigation begins at t + 1. If firms are not
condemned, which occurs with probability (1− s), then they continue
to play cooperatively; if they are found guilty, then they pay the total
fine F and they have to play non cooperatively during one period.
As in the cooperation case, if one firm deviates from the collusive
agreement, firms play non cooperatively until the end of the game.
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Consequently, there are two types of deviation in this game: the deviation
from the collusive agreement and the reporting to the AA.
The equilibrium of the game can now be analysed.
3 Equilibria
This section describes the various types of equilibria. We describe the perfect
Nash equilibria of the game and we have to resolve this game considering
merger or not in the first period.
Motta and Polo (2003) suggested that there are three types of equilib-
ria: no collusion (NC), collusion and revelation (CR) and collusion and no
revelation (CNR). The existence of these equilibria depends on the value of
the relevant parameters.
CR equilibrium exists if the profit of firm colluding and revealing to the
AA is greater than the profit of a firm which deviates.
CNR equilibrium exists if firm which colludes and does not reveal infor-
mation has no incentive to reveal information to the AA and also to deviate
from the collusive agreement.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the common discount factor.
The results obtained by Motta-Polo (2003) are as follows:
lemma 1. (Motta-Polo (2003) for low values of f)
• for s ∈ [0, sCNR) and α ∈ [0,min(1, αNC(s)) : CNR exists.
• for s ∈ [sNC , 1] and α ∈ [max(αNC(s), αCR), 1] : NC exists.
• for s ∈ [sCNR, 1] and α ∈ [0, αCR) : CR exists.
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with: 
sNC =
(1+δ)(piM−(1−δ)piD−δpiN )
δ2(piM−piN+F )
sCNR=
(1+δ)(piM−piN+f)
δ(piM−piN+F )
αCR =
piM−(1−δ)piD−δpiN
(piM−piN+f)
αNC =
(1+δ)(piM−(1−δ)piD−δpiN )
δs(piM−piN+F )
[Insert figure 1]
Figure 1 in the appendix represents graphically the Subgame Perfect
Equilibria.
The region labelled 1 in the figure 1 represents the area where parameters
lead to CR under leniency programs with no actual leniency. Region 2 rep-
resents the area where the parameters are such as to make ex-post desistence
more easy by encouraging revelation and by shortening investigation time.
Note that αCR ≥ 0 for δ > δ˜ = piD−piMpiD−piN which is the usual critical
discount factor when firms collude with no threat of prosecution.
3.1 The impact of a merger on collusion
In this subsection, the first stage of the game is examined in more detail.
Two cases must be analysed depending on whether the merger is accepted
in the first period or not. If the AA rejects the merger in the first period,
then the repeated game is played with n firms. As said before, the two firms
which are proposing to merge are identical (k1 = k2). The others have the
same production capacity : ki = kj ,∀i ∈ n, i 6= (1, 2);
∑n
i=1 ki = 1.
Received wisdom suggests that mergers may tend to create structural
conditions which facilitate collusion. Firstly, coordination is easier to sustain
when the number of competitors is smaller and secondly, as the number of
firms decreases, each firm gets a higher share of the market. This has two
implications, the gain from deviating decreases for each firm and the long-
term benefit of maintaining collusion is increased because it gets a higher
share of the collusive profit.
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The impact of a merger on collusion is captured in our framework by the
comparative static on αCR, αNC and sCNR.
We are going to detail the proceeding of the comparative static on αCR
and it will be the same conduct for the others.
To do this, we compute the value of φ = α
bm
CR
αamCR
where the superscripts bm
and am denote the threshold value αCR before and after the merger. If φ is
stricly greater than unity, then the border line αCR in figure 1 moves down.
Therefore, there exists some values of α and p for which firms collude and
reveal before merger whereas they do not collude if the merger is accepted
by the AA. In other words, a merger would attenuate the scope of collusion.
To simplify calculations, we assume that c = 0.
Individual profit functions of the firms (∀i = 1...n) are given by :
piM= 16ki
piD=
ki(−2−ki)2
18(1+2ki)
piN=
βi(2ki−βi)
2ki(1+β)2
with βi = kiki+1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.
These profit functions correspond to the case where a proposed merger is
rejected in the first period (n firms compete in the industry). If the merger is
accepted in the first period (n− 1 firms), production capacity of the merger
entity is calculated as follows : k1+2 = k1 + k2 = 2k1.
Numerical simulations of φ and δ˜ are represented in figure 2 in the ap-
pendix.
We see in figure 2 for k1 high enough (k1 > 0.3) and where δ is sufficiently
high that φ > 1. But for low values of k1, φ is always stricly less than unity
(which is normalized by a plane with φ = 0).
lemma 2. With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms,
a merger will cause the border line αCR to move down (resp. up)
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As noted before, we do the same with the other border lines αNC and
sCNR and two lemmas follow :
lemma 3. With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms,
a merger will cause the border line αNC to move to the southwest (resp.
northwest)
lemma 4. With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms,
a merger will cause the border line sCNR to move to the left (resp. right).
All these lemmas are summarized in Figure 3 in the appendix.
The following proposition gives the impact of a merger on collusion :
proposition 1. The impact of a merger on collusion
• With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms, a
merger will reduce (resp. increase) the space of parameters under
which firms tend to collude.
• With high (resp. low) production capacity of the merging firms, a
merger will increase (resp. reduce) the space of parameters under
which firms tend to collude with revelation, in comparison with the
space of parameters under which firms tend to collude without reveala-
tion.
The inference to be drawn from this result is that the larger the firm, the
more able it is to derogate from the collusion agreement because the ability
of outsiders to punish deviations is attenuated.
3.2 Profitability of the merger
In this section we study the profitability incentives for a merger.
First, comparison must be between the individual profit of a merging
firm and the individual profit of this firm without any merger in a Nash
environment.
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To simplify we denote by piNind(M) (resp. pi
N
ind(M)) the individual profit
of a firm prior to merge in a Nash environment with the merger (resp.
without the merger).
When we compute the static profits, we obtain :
piNind(M) > pi
N
ind(M) (1)
So the actualised profits of the firms are greater with a merger than
without a merger :
piNind(M)[1 + δ + δ
2 + ...] > piNind(M)[1 + δ + δ2 + ...] (2)
Therefore, firms have incentives to merge if we do not take into consid-
eration the possibility for firms to collude.
What is interesting is to compare the values of the profits when we take
into account collusion. More precisely, we compare the interesting case in
which a merger is accepted and no collusion follows with the case in which
the merger is rejected with collusion after. There are two possibilities : CR
equilibrium and CNR equilibrium.
The static profit of the firm 1 or 2 when all firms collude in the industry
and without any merger is :
picollind (M) =
k1
6
< piNashind (M) (3)
• if the equilibrium strategy is CNR the actualised profit (without
merger) in a one-shot game is :
α(picollind + δ([(1− s)(picollind ) + s(piNind(M)− F )])) + (1− α)(1 + δ)picollind
(4)
• if the equilibrium strategy is CR the actualised profit (without merger)
in a one-shot game is :
(1− α)picollind + α[piNind(M)− f)] (5)
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